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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Habeb contends the district court improperly flipped the burden of proof when it
awarded restitution in this case, and that, under the proper burdens, the State did not present
sufficient evidence to carry its burden. In response, the State asserts that Mr. Habeb did not
preserve this issue for appeal without citing authority or providing argument in support of that
assertion. As such, this Court should refuse to consider that bare assertion. The applicable
precedent makes it clear the State’s bare assertion is meritless.
The State also misses the point entirely on the merits, as it contends it met its burden by
presenting the repair estimate, as that estimate was accurate as to how much the repairs would
cost. However, Mr. Habeb is arguing that the State cannot rely on the presumption that the
repair estimate, accurate though it may be, was less than the actual value of the car, and thus,
truly represents the actual loss, in this case because of the other evidence in the record. As a
result, because the State had the ultimate burden of proof, the State had to prove the repair value
was, in fact, less than the actual value of the car in order to prove the repair value really did
represent the actual loss. The State’s only response was to make the bare assertion that these
legal principles should not apply because they are an “overly complicated” “burden-shifting
metric,” which is not applicable to restitution proceedings without citing precedent or making an
argument in support.

(See Resp. Br., p.5.) The precedent reveals the State’s assertion is

meritless.
Finally, the State does not address the fact that the district court still reached its decision
by improperly flipping the burden of proof to Mr. Habeb. As such, even if the State were correct
about the repair estimate, this case should still be remanded so the district court can determine,
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under a proper understanding of the burden of proof, whether that estimate was sufficient to
prove the actual loss in this case.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Habeb’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUE
Whether the restitution order was not supported by sufficient evidence to show the actual
economic loss in this case.

3

ARGUMENT
The Restitution Order Was Not Supported By Sufficient Evidence To Show The Actual
Economic Loss In This Case

A.

The State’s Assertion, Made Without Citing Authority, That Mr. Habeb’s Arguments Are
Not Preserved For Appeal Actually Flies In The Face Of Numerous Decisions From The
Idaho Supreme Court And Court Of Appeals
The State asserts, without citation to authority or offering argument in support, that

Mr. Habeb did not preserve the argument that the repair estimate was not sufficient to prove the
actual loss, given all the evidence in this case for appeal. (Resp. Br., p.5.) However, “[a] party
waives an issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are
lacking.” Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168 (2014) (internal quotation omitted, emphasis
added). As such, this Court should not consider the State’s bare, conclusory assertion regarding
the issue of preservation.
That the State did not cite any authority on this issue is not surprising because, from any
angle, the applicable precedent contradicts the State’s bare assertion. First, the Idaho Supreme
Court has explained that the “specific arguments” made in support of a position on a particular
issue may “evolve[]” between the trial and appeal so long as the “substantive issues” do not
change. Ada County Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017)
(emphasis from original). At the restitution hearing, defense counsel specifically argued: “I
don’t think the State has quite met their burden on the amount of restitution they want” based on
the repair estimate and the Blue Book quote for a clean-title car because Mr. Al Rubaye did not
know the actual value of his car. (Tr., p.23, L.24 - p.26, L.9.) On appeal, Mr. Habeb still argues
that the State did not meet its burden to prove the actual loss in this case because there is no
evidence of the actual value of Mr. Al Rubaye’s car. (App. Br., pp.5-11.) Therefore, as in
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Brooke View, Mr. Habeb has maintained the same position regarding the substantive issue. As
such, that issue and all its attendant arguments are preserved for appeal.
Second, when the error arises in the district court’s ruling on a contested issue, the
aggrieved party does not need to renew his objection in order to preserve challenges to the
district court’s decision. Lasselle v. Special Products Co., 106 Idaho 170, 173 (1983); State v.
Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557 (Ct. App. 2010); see also State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553
(1998) (explaining that an issue is preserved for appeal when the issue “was argued to or decided
by the trial court”) (emphasis added). Therefore, the argument that the district court abused its
discretion by flipping the burden of proof in its decision to award restitution in this case is
properly raised on appeal.
Third, the sufficiency of the evidence can be challenged for the first time on appeal.
I.R.C.P. 50(b)(3)1; accord State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694, 695-96 (Ct. App. 1994); see also
State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873 (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that, while a challenge to the
admission of certain evidence may require a contemporaneous objection, a challenge that the
admitted evidence was not sufficient to prove the claim being made does not).2 As such,

1

The rules of civil procedure are applicable in restitution proceedings. State v. Jensen, 149
Idaho 758, 762 (Ct. App. 2010).
2
The Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Kelley does not demand a different conclusion.
See State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 689 n.1 (2017). The Supreme Court’s primary reason for
refusing to consider the sufficiency argument in that case was that the defendant “did not raise
that issue in the briefing” on appeal. Id. Because the appellant in that case had not provided
argument or authority on that point prior to the hearing on review to the Supreme Court, he had
waived that issue for appeal. See Murray, 156 Idaho at 168. Thus, the subsequent part of the
Kelley Court’s statement – about the issue not being raised in the district court and there not
being an adverse ruling – is dicta because it was not necessary to resolve the issue. That is
especially true in light of the fact that, in Kelley, the Supreme Court did not have briefing
regarding the propriety of raising a sufficiency claim for first time no appeal. See id; State v.
Barton, 154 Idaho 289, 294 (2013) (Horton, J., concurring) (explaining that the Court should not
address issues without first receiving “input from interested parties”). Here, unlike in Kelley, the
preservation question is squarely presented in the appellate briefing, and there was an adverse
5

Mr. Habeb’s argument – that the repair estimate was not sufficient to prove the actual loss given
the evidence in this case – is properly raised on appeal. Compare State v. Ibarra, Not Reported
in P.3d, 2018 WL 4608801, *4 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding the sufficiency of the State’s evidence
to prove its claim for restitution could be raised for the first time on appeal), rev. denied.3
For all those reasons, this Court should rejected the State’s frivolous, bare assertion that
this issue was not preserved for appeal.

B.

The State’s Attempt To Rely On The Presumption That The Repair Estimate Was Less
Than The Actual Value Of The Car, Such That It Would Prove The Actual Loss, Is
Improper Because The Bubble On That Presumption Burst By The Other Evidence In
The Record
As the State concedes it bore the burden of proof in this case.

(Resp. Br., p.5.)

Specifically, it had to prove the loss actually suffered in this case by a preponderance of the
evidence. I.C. § 19-5304(6). This means that the State had to show, in light of all the evidence
in the record, that the amount claimed as restitution is more probably than not the amount of loss
actually suffered by the victim. See Oxley v. Medicine Rock Specialties, Inc., 139 Idaho 476, 481
(2003) (explaining what the preponderance standard requires the party bearing the burden must
show).

ruling – the district court’s award of restitution, which it based on Mr. Habeb’s failure to prove
the actual value of the car in question. Therefore, even in light of Kelley, this Court should
consider Mr. Habeb’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence the State presented in regard to
its request for restitution, especially since the civil rules expressly authorize it to do so.
3
Mr. Habeb recognizes that unpublished decisions do not constitute precedent, and he does not
cite Ibarra as authority requiring a particular decision in this case; rather, he merely references it
as a historical example of how a learned court analyzed a similar issue. Compare Staff of Idaho
Real Estate Comm’n v. Nordling, 135 Idaho 630, 634 (2001) (quoting Bourgeois v. Murphy, 119
Idaho 611, 617 (1991)) (“When this Court had cause to consider unpublished opinions from
other jurisdictions because an appellant had discussed the cases in his petition, we found the
presentation of the unpublished opinions as ‘quite appropriat[e].’ Likewise, we find the hearing
officer’s consideration of the unpublished opinion, not as binding precedent but as an example,
was appropriate.”).
6

The State maintains that it met that burden by presenting the repair estimate, as it argues
the repair estimate was, itself, supported by substantial and competent evidence. (Resp. Br., p.4.)
That misses the point entirely. Mr. Habeb is not challenging the reliability of the repair estimate.
Rather, he is arguing that, in light of the other evidence presented, the repair estimate (accurate
though it may be), is not sufficient to prove the actual losses suffered in this case. That is
because, without evidence of the actual value of the car, a repair estimate can only prove the
actual loss based on the presumption that the amount to repair is lower than the actual value of
the car. See State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 703 (Ct. App. 1997).
The State could not rely on that presumption in this case because there was “substantial
evidence contradicting the presumed fact” in the testimony Mr. Habeb elicited during crossexamination and in the State’s own exhibits. D. Craig Lewis, Should the Bubble Always Burst?
The Need for a Different Treatment of Presumptions under I.R.E. 301, 32 IDAHO L. REV. 5, 6
(1995). Specifically, the other evidence showed that the actual value of this car was less than the
Blue Book value because of the salvage title and that the repair estimate was, itself, only slight
less than the Blue Book value (Ex., pp.13, 17; Tr., p.13, Ls.9-14; R., p.157.) The district court
found that evidence to be sparse and of questionable reliability in regard to the question of actual
loss. (R., pp.155, 157-58.)
Based on that other evidence, “a reasonable person could find the nonexistence of” the
presumed fact – that the repair estimate was less than the actual value of the car – which means
the State cannot rely on that presumption (the bubble has burst). Bongiovi v. Jamison, 110 Idaho
734, 738 (1986). As a result, the State, which still had the ultimate burden of proof, still had to
prove the repair estimate was, in fact, less than the actual value of the car in order to prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the repair estimate truly reflected the actual loss.
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The State does not address any of that analysis. (See generally Resp. Br.) Instead, it
asserts this Court should ignore these legal principles on the basis that I.R.E. 301(a), which sets
out how such presumptions work in civil cases, is an “overly complicated” “burden shifting
metric” that is not applicable to restitution proceedings. (Resp. Br., p.5.) However, as with its
assertion about preservation, the State cites no authority and offers no argument in support of
that assertion, and so, this Court should refuse to consider that bare assertion as well. Murray,
156 Idaho at 168.
At any rate, the State’s bare assertion in that regard is directly contrary to the applicable
precedent. The Court of Appeals has made it clear that, like the Rules of Civil Procedure, “[t]he
Idaho Rules of Evidence apply to restitution hearings except as provided in I.C. § 19-5304(6),”
State v. McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 284 (Ct. App. 2014); see Jensen, 149 Idaho at 762 (addressing
the use of the Rules of Civil Procedure in restitution proceedings). Subsection (6) of I.C. § 195304 specifically addresses the evidentiary rules regarding hearsay evidence: “and the court may
consider such hearsay as maybe contained in the presentence report, victim impact statement or
otherwise presented to the court.” I.C. §19-5304(6).

Because I.R.E. 301(a) addresses the

procedural approach to the burdens of proof which the courts routinely apply in all civil hearings,
not the hearsay rules, it is applicable to the restitution context.
Therefore, since the State failed to present any evidence about the actual value of the car,
and since it could not, given all the evidence in the record, rely on the presumption that the repair
estimate was less than the actual value of the car, the State failed to carry its burden to prove by a
preponderance the repair estimate really reflected the loss actually suffered in this case.
And even if the State is correct, and the repair estimate might be sufficient to carry the
State’s burden, this Court should still remand the case because the district court’s decision to that
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effect was tainted by the fact that it flipped the burden of proof in order to overcome its
conclusion that the State’s evidence was otherwise sparse and of questionable reliability (an
aspect of the case which the State does not address at all on appeal (see generally Resp. Br.)).
Specifically, the district court determined it was Mr. Habeb’s responsibility to disprove the
presumption and actually demonstrate that the actual value of the car was lower than the repair
estimate. (R., p.158.) However, the applicable legal standards only require the party opposing
the presumption to show “a reasonable person could find the nonexistence of” the presumed fact;
they do not need to affirmatively disprove the presumption in order for the presumption to cease
to function. Bongiovi, 110 Idaho at 738 (emphasis added); Lewis, supra, at 6-7 (explaining the
party opposing the presumption need only present evidence which “indicates” the presumption is
faulty in that case to burst the bubble). That is because requiring the party opposing the
presumption to affirmatively disprove the presumption has the effect of flipping the ultimate
burden of proof. See id. In this case, for example, it meant Mr. Habeb had to affirmatively
prove the restitution request was improper, rather than the State prove that it was proper.
As such, the district court abused its discretion by acting contrary to the applicable legal
standards. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018). In such cases,
“[w]hen the discretion exercised by a trial court is affected by an error of law, the role of the
appellate court is to note the error made and remand the case for appropriate findings.”
Montgomery v. Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009). Therefore, this Court should remand this
case so the district court can make appropriate findings under a proper understanding of the
burden of proof about whether the repair estimate was actually sufficient, in the absence of
evidence about the actual value of the car in question, to prove the actual loss in this case.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Habeb respectfully requests this Court vacate the restitution order in his case.
DATED this 15th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15th day of February, 2019, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
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